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The Blue and Brown Books Preliminary Studies for the 'Philosophical Investigations'

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    Available in PDF - DJVU Format | The Blue and Brown Books Preliminary Studies for the 'Philosophical Investigations'.pdf | Language: UNKNOWN
    Ludwig Wittgenstein(Author)

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  • Ludwig Wittgenstein(Author)
  • Basil Blackwell (1975)
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  • Politics & Social Sciences

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  • By wiredweird on June 19, 2007

    "I have been accused of thinking about women too much ... But what could be more beautiful than thinking about women?" - Auguste RodinRodin is a striking example of an artist who achieved recognition in his own lifetime. That included financial independence, which gave him the freedom to explore directions for which patronage would have been hard to find. In fact, the display of some images in this series is said to have cost the director of the Grand-Ducal Museum his job.It's easy to think of Rodin's masterworks in statuary as complete command of form. Whatever Rodin thought of them, it wasn't enough. His later life produced "one-minute drawings" like these by the thousands. He was looking for something, possibly within himself, that he never found words to articulate wholly. One proposal holds that he wanted to capture the dimension of time, the frozen moment, that eluded stone and bronze.Perhaps he succeeded. Beyond that, he also succeeded in collecting a wonderful catalog of female figure - not just figure, but dynamic and exciting figure. The excitement is more than just intellectual. It goes well towards the carnal but stops short of vulgarity, at least to a modern eye. These models presented not just their forms but their arousal, of themselves and of their same-sex partners. Rodin's genius captured their passion and his own, stripped of any critical sentiment.This book will work well to complement a library that already represents Rodin's better-known works. These watercolor drawings tend toward a sameness of color, contrast, and style that might wear on some viewers' patience. I guess it's not for everyone. If you've already befriended Rodin's work, though, this is an enjoyable way to deepen your relationship.-- wiredweird

  • By curlysue on October 31, 2014

    Gorgeous AND informative. Not just pictures but the story with them.

  • By Richard Porricelli on February 18, 2011

    This book(really a long essay) is Rilke at his discriptive best.It is not just a biography, rather it is a personal account of the life and work of a man he knew (lived for a time not far from his studio and did secretarial work for)so it has a deeply felt personal almost loving quality.Rilke's writing style when applied the visual Arts are a perfect combination.

  • By epiklesis on July 9, 2015

    Elegant and insightful.

  • By Robert Myers on October 19, 2014

    Interesting dialog accompanies the art -- very good. Through the lens of time Rodin is now considered a master but several of his works were rejected and censored during his own lifetime.

  • By Robert Jeges on July 20, 2007

    The blue book is concerned with an exploration of meaning in language. Reputedly one of Wittgenstein most direct and accesible works, it is subtle and containing many of his ideas that appear in the previous Tractatus and later Investigations. A good dose of semiotics is needed to organise his ideas in a context more accessible to the casual reader interested in linguistics and neuropsychology.

  • By Tom Brody on April 17, 2006

    The Blue & Brown Books are fun to read. They establish most of the concepts that are discussed in the P.I. These concepts are notated below, along with page numbers. My notes below indicate the page numbers where these concepts occur in the B&B Books, as well as in the P.I. If you read the B&B Books, you will have a relatively easy time recognizing the concepts (but not necessarily understanding them), as they are set forth, when you read the P.I. You will know what to look out for. Additionally, it seems that much of the first 50 pages of the P.I. is spent not doing philosophy, but is spent reflecting about philosophy. This 50 page span of reflection is apt to be particularly confusing, unless one first reads the B&B Books. The end-result of reading the B&B Books that is: When you proceed to read the P.I., you will feel self-assured and happy in recognizing the same concepts, and new variations of these concepts, that appear in the P.I.Here is some late-breaking news. A few years after posting this review, I finally published a real paper about Wittgenstein. The following paper contains several pages about Wittgenstein, that is, about his analysis of the meaning of the word, "expectation." My article got published in early 2010:Brody, T. (2010) Obviousness in patents following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision of KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. in Journal Patent Trademark Office Society 92:26-70.To summarize, W.'s philosophy first of all shows how the grammar of our language makes us think that mental acts (or mental processes, mental images, or feelings), of which we are conscious, are required for our various language games. Again and again, W. discloses paper experiments demonstrating that mental acts (of which we are conscious) are not at all required for language games. Next, W. explains how our various language games are like games, where these language games include: meaning, understanding, referring, commanding, and so on. W. devotes much space to providing exercises disclosing different classes of language games, where the exercises are meant to convince us that there is no essential mental act (of which we are conscious). Finally, W. provides an answer as to what is essential for a word to transmit meaning, understanding, reference, a command, a request, and the like. However, W. provides only a sketchy answer, namely, that the answer lies in some institution or use. NOTESMENTAL ACT OR MENTAL PROCESS. Notion that meaning, referring, understanding, depends on a mental image or a mental process. Wittgenstein explains how the grammar of the layperson gives birth to this notion. Wittgenstein explains that this is a false notion and, at times, makes fun of this notion.a. The mental image or mental process is like consulting a paradigm or prototype (page 128, 165, 166 of B&B Books);b. The mental image or mental process is like consulting a table (page 100 of B&B Books);c. The mental image or mental process is like "accompaniment of another," "some kind of addition" (page 168, 169 of B&B Books). Wittgenstein reveals what the layperson believes understanding and imagination to require a mental image or mental process. Wittgenstein says that the layperson exclaims: "But when I image something, something certainly happens!" (page 97 of PI).d. "You say to me: "You understand this expression . . . as if the sense were an atmosphere accompanying the word . . ."(page 41 of PI).e. "What really comes before our mind when we understand a word?-Isn't it something like a picture? Well, suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you hear the word "cube", say the drawing of a cube." (page 46 of PI).f. Wittgenstein shows how we are tricked into thinking there is this mental act or mental process, in an example of the language game of intending: "But didn't I already intend [by way of a mental process] the whole construction of the sentence . . . at its beginning? So surely it already existed in my mind before I said it out loud . . . But here we are construing a misleading picture of "intending" . . ." (page 92 of PI).g. Wittgenstein says that the layperson says, "we sometimes call it "thinking" to accompany a sentence by a mental process . . .," thus implying that this is how the layperson comes to think that language games must be accompanied by a mental process.h. Wittgenstein says that the layperson comes to believe that language games require a mental image or mental process, since the layperson has the false picture that "the processes called . . . recognizing always consisted in comparing two impressions with one another. It is as if I carried a picture of an object with me and used it to perform an identification of an object as the one represented by the picture." (page 133 of PI).i. Wittgenstein makes fun of the notion that language games require a mental image or mental picture, when he writes that "It is no more essential to the understanding of a proposition that one should imagine anything in connexion with it, than that one should make a sketch from it." (page 102 of PI).j. Wittgenstein tells how the layperson is tricked into thinking that language games of understanding require a mental process or mental picture, as the layperson is all to willing to say: "But when I imaging something, or even actually see objects, I have got something which my neighbor has not. . . I understand you. You want to look about you and say: "At any rate only I have got THIS."" (page 102 of PI).k. "A gun is fired in my presence and I say: "This crash wasn't as loud as I expected" . . . was there a crash, louder than that of a gun, in your imagination?" (page 40 of B&B Books),l. "I see someone pointing a gun and say "I expect a bang". The shot is fired. . . . so did that bang somehow already exist in your expectation? . . . Did something of the shot already occur in my expectation?" (page 110 of PI),m. Wittgenstein explains how we are tricked into thinking that the mental image or mental process exists. Wittgenstein points out that people generally agree to the proposition that "The purpose of language is to express thoughts.-So presumably the purpose of every sentence is to express a thought." (page 118 of PI). Wittgenstein points out that the layperson's agreement to this proposition is what makes the layperson believe that the mental images or mental process are necessary for language games (page 118 of PI).n. Wittgenstein provides another example that shows that a mental act or a mental process need not accompany language games (example of expecting). "We say "I am expecting him", when we believe that he will come, though his coming does not occupy our thoughts." (page 129 of PI).o. Wittgenstein provides yet another example showing that language games do not require a mental image or mental process. "You were interrupted a while ago; do you still know what you were going to say?" If I do know now, and say it--does that mean that I had already thought it before, only not said it? No." (page 138 of PI).p. Meaning, referring, understanding do not depend on mental acts (mental acts of which we are conscious) because of the fact that we can say, "Napoleon was crowned in 1804," and also mean "the man who won the battle of Austerlitz." (page 39; 142 of B&B Books).q. Wittgenstein argues that meaning, referring, understanding, are not dependent on a mental picture, because we can say, "King's College is no fire," even though (if you did have a mental image) there would be a dozen buildings that look just like that image. (page 39 of B&B Books).r. "When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." (page 90 of PI).s. Wittgenstein shows how the grammar of the layperson suggests that language games require a separate mental image or mental process: ""One is tempted to use the following picture: what he really `wanted to say', what he `meant' was already present somewhere in his mind even before we gave it expression." (page 91 of PI).t. Wittgenstein agrees that mental images do occur, even though he says that they are not a necessary part of any language game, with the exception of the language game of describing what you imagine: "The mental picture is the picture which is described when someone describes what he imagines." (page 98 of PI).u. Wittgenstein makes fun of the notion that a mental image blue is used when we use the language game of color (of the word blue): "Has anyone shewn me the image of the colour blue and told me that this is the image of blue?" (page 100 of PI).FEELINGS (feelings are a subset of mental acts or mental processes). Notion that language games (e.g., meaning, referring, understanding, intending) depend on a mental process, where the mental process is a feeling. Wittgenstein explains that this is a false notion and makes fun of this notion (pages 100, 105, 112, 129, 132 135, 144, 145, 148, 156 of B&B Books):a. Feelings of familiarity (page 180 of B&B Books);b. Relaxing of a strain (page 100 of B&B Books);c. Feelings of tension or feeling relieved (page 129 of B&B Books).d. "When I said, "Give me an apple and a pear and leave the room," had I the same feeling when I pronounced the two words "and"?" (page 79 of B&B Books)e. "Didn't I have a sort of homely feeling when I took in the word `tree'?" (page 156 of B&B Books).GENERAL PROPERTIES OF ACTUAL GAMES (games of sports, cards, board games) AND LANGUAGE GAMES. Concept that that there are many different types of games, that it is fruitless to define "games" by any single characteristic game, that it is fruitless to find a common element in all games, and that games are better defined by way of a family of resemblances.a. Wittgenstein states that the search for this common element is like attempting to strip off "its particular costume" or like trying to find the real artichoke by stripping off its leaves (page 125 of B&B Books).b. Wittgenstein provides examples of the multitude of games, for example, bounded card games and unbounded card games (page 91, 92 of B&B Books),c. A game is something characterized by "a multitude of circumstances" (page 157 of B&B Books),d. But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all these constructions . . . [o]ne might as well say: "Something runs through the whole thread-namely the continuous overlapping of these fibres . . . " (page 28 of PI).LIST OF LANGUAGE GAMES. Wittgenstein uses these examples to demonstrate the absence of a mental image or mental process in these language games, and also to demonstrate the existence of the family quality in these language games:a. Languages game of can (page 116 of B&B Books),b. Languages game of trying (page 116 of B&B Books),c. Languages game of searching (page 129 of B&B Books),d. Languages game of expecting (page 183 of B&B Books),e. Languages game of familiarity (page 181 of B&B Books),f. Languages game of color (page 134 of B&B Books),g. Languages game of understanding (page 113, 155), "I then try to remember what happened in my mind when I understood the words I did understand and when I didn't understand the others . . . this experiment will sow us a multitude of different characteristic experiences, it will not show us any one experience which we should be inclined to call the experience of understanding . . . [b]ut opposed to these there will be a large class of cases in which I should have to say "I know of no particular experience at all, I just said `Yes', or `No'". Wittgenstein then provides a list of these experiences (page 156 of B&B Books);h. Languages game of sameness (pages 140, 141 of B&B Books),i. Languages game of observing (page 152 of B&B Books),j. Languages games of recognizing (page 127,165 of B&B Books),k. Languages games of thinking (page 148 of B&B Books). Wittgenstein argues that the self observation of any mental image or mental act that occurs during thinking, will not tell us what thinking is: "In order to get clear about the meaning of the word "think" we watch ourselves while we think; what we observe will be what the word means"-But the concept is not used like that. (It would be as if without knowing how to play chess, I were to try and make out what the word "mate" meant by close observation of the last move of some game of chess.)" (page 88 of PI). Here, Wittgenstein is implying that the language game of thinking requires context (page 88 of PI). "Say: "Yes, this pen is blunt . . . [f]irst thinking it; then without thought; then just think the thought without the words . . . [b]ut what constitutes thought here is not some process which has to accompany the words if they are not to be spoken without thought." (page 91 of PI).l. Languages games of willing, volition, intention (page 150, 151, 157). ""is it time to get up?", he tries to make up his mind, and then suddenly he finds himself getting up. Describing it this way emphasizes the absence of an act of volition." Wittgenstein also uses the example of volition to illustrate the "game character" of the language game of volition: "But there is not one common difference between so called voluntary acts and involuntary ones, viz, the presence or absence of one element, the "act of volition."" (page 152 of B&B Books),m. Language games of belief (page 151 154 of B&B Books),n. Language games of using a name or naming (page 173, page 16 of PI),o. Language games of observing (page 152 of B&B Books),p. Language games of deriving (page 124 of B&B Books),q. Language game of similarity or having something in common (page 133, 135, 136 of B&B Books),r. Language game of reading (page 122 of B&B Books),s. Language games of interpreting drawings. "And yet one feels that what one calls the expression of the face [a drawing] is something that can be detached from the drawing of the face. It is as though we could say: "This face has a particular expression: namely this" (pointing to something) . . . [W]e are, as it were, under the optical delusion which . . . makes us think that there are two objects where there is only one. The delusion is assisted by our using the verb "to have", saying "The face has a particular expression"." (page 162, 163 of B&B Books). See also page 168 169 of B&B Books). Here, Wittgenstein points out how the layperson's use of ordinary grammar makes him think that a mental image or mental process is needed in the language games of understanding, of interpreting, etc., whereas, in fact, understanding, interpretation, etc., comes from context or from an institution.t. Language games of interpreting music. ""What is it like to know the tempo in which a piece of music should be played?" And the idea suggest itself that there must be a paradigm somewhere in our mind, and that we have adjusted the tempo to conform to that paradigm. But in most cases . . . I will . . . just whistle it in a particular way, and nothing will have been present to my mind but the tune actually whistled (not an image of that)." (page 166 of B&B Books). "Sing this tune with expression. And now don't sing it, but repeat its expression!-And here one actually might repeat something. For example, motions of the body, slower and faster breathing, and so on." (page 91 of PI). Here, Wittgenstein seems to be showing how the layperson's use of grammar indicates that expression is a mental process separate from the singing (page 91 of PI).u. Similarly, in a discussion of the language game of recognition, Wittgenstein states that "Suppose the game . . . consisted in this, that B should say whether he knows the object or not but does not say what it is. Suppose he was shown an ordinary pencil . . . [w]hat happened when he recognized it? . . . the words "Oh, this is a pencil" did not refer to a paradigm, the similarity of which with the pencil shown B had recognized. Asked "what is a pencil?", Be would not have pointed to another object as the paradigm or sample, but could straight away have pointed to the pencil shown to him . . . [h]e just reacted in this particular way by saying this word." (page 128 of B&B Books).v. Wittgenstein explains why the notion that a mental image or mental process is used in understanding, interpreting, etc., a word or a drawing. Wittgenstein explains: ""The word falls", one is tempted to explain, "into a mould of my mind long prepared fro it". But . . . I don't perceive both the word and a mould . . ." (page 170 of B&B Books).INSTITUTIONS, CONTEXT, USE, SITUATIONS. Wittgenstein concludes that meaning, referring, understanding, etc., depends on some connection to context, uses, institutions, connection.a. "The meaning of a phrase for us is characterized by the use we make of it. The meaning is not a mental accompaniment to the expression . . . I want to play chess, and a man gives the white king a paper crown, leaving the use of the piece unaltered, but telling me that the crown has a meaning to him in the game . . . I say: "as long as it doesn't alter the use of the piece, it hasn't what I call a meaning."" (page 65 of B&B Books).b. "[W]e refer by the phrase "understanding a word" not necessarily to that which happens while we are saying or hearing it, but to the whole environment of the event of saying it." (page 157 of B&B Books).c. Wittgenstein indicates that meaning comes not from a mental image or mental process, but from use. "What we call their meaning is not anything which they have got in them or which is fastened to them irrespective of what use we make of them." (page 170 of B&B Books).d. Regarding the language game of naming, Wittgenstein says: "We can therefore say that if naming something is to be more than just uttering a sound while pointing to something, there must also be . . . the knowledge of how in the particular case the sound . . . is to be used." (page 173 of B&B Books).e. "This thought ties on to thoughts which I have had before . . . [t]his thought is connected with those earlier thoughts", and yet be unable to shew the connexion." (page 139 of PI).f. "Of course, if the meaning is the use we make of the word . . . [b]ut we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the "use," which is extended in time . . . [b]ut can the whole use of the word come before my mind, when I understand it in this way?" (page 46 of PI). "One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that." (page 93 of PI).g. "An intention [in language game of intending] is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions." (page 92 of PI).h. This concerns the language game the color red. "What am I to say about the word "red"? --that it means something "confronting us all" and that everyone should really have another word, besides this one, to mean his own sensation of red? Or is it like this: the word "red" means something known to everyone . . ." (page 81 of PI). Thus, Wittgenstein seems to say that meaning comes from something confronting us all, from something known to everyone.i. The following concerns the language game of expecting. "An expectation is imbedded in a situation, from which arises. The expectation of an explosion may, for example, arise from a situation in which an explosion is to be expected." (page 129 of PI).j. This concerns Wittgenstein's connection of language games with use. ""It is as if we could grasp the whole use of the word in a flash.". . . Can't the use-in a certain sense-be grasped in a flash? (page 65 of PI). Here, Wittgenstein seems to be suggesting how meaning comes from something other than a mental image or mental process: "A machine as symbolizing its actions:the action of a machine-I might say at first-seems to be there in nit from the start. What does that mean?-If we know the machine, everything else, that is its movement, seems to be already completely determine. We talk as if these parts could only move in this way . . . "The machine's action seems to be in it from the start . . ." ". . . the possible movements of a machine are already there in it in some mysterious way . . ." (page 66 of PI).k. "I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it . . . a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign posts, a custom." (page 68 of PI).l. "To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions)." (page 68 of PI).

  • By Myra Kent on August 4, 2015

    Beautifully written. Lacking in factual information.

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